ABSTRACT The deployment of heterogeneous networks (HetNets) can significantly boost the network capacity. However, the large number of small cell base stations (SBSs) deployed in HetNets can result in an increased total energy consumption. One of the promising techniques to reduce the energy consumption of networks is base station (BS) ON/OFF switching (sleeping) approaches. Due to device lifetime and energy waste by unnecessary switchings, the number of switchings is considered as an important problem. In this paper, we formulate the ON/OFF switching problem as a satisfaction game, where BSs seek to meet certain performance constraints in order to avoid the frequent BS switchings. Furthermore, BSs can choose their transmission power levels according to the network conditions in a distributed manner. The proposed satisfaction game involves a multi-step process. In the first step, we aim at satisfying the players with the high satisfaction threshold in a predefined time interval. To measure a BS's satisfaction, a utility function is used that includes BS's load and power consumption, in which the load of each BS is coupled with the load of other BSs. Since all players cannot be simultaneously satisfied, unsatisfied players decide to reduce their thresholds, and form a game with the redefined thresholds. To solve the game, a regret-based satisfaction algorithm and a satisfaction equilibrium search algorithm are applied. Simulation results show that the proposed schemes can achieve significant reductions in the number of switchings compared with the benchmark methods.
Furthermore, based on the results from China Mobile Communications Corporation, a BS consumes 100% and about 50%-60% energy at the peak traffic load and zero traffic load, respectively [8] . Therefore, switching OFF BSs (alternatively termed as sleep mode) and keeping them in energy-saving mode are effective solutions to achieve energy saving in low traffic load situations [13] , [14] . The main advantages of these approaches are easier to test and implement as they do not require upgrading the equipments and changing the network architecture [11] .
On the other hand, a major priority in HetNets is self-organization issue. In particular, 3GPP has defined selforganizing network (SON) as a key standardization feature [15] . SON allows BSs adjust their configurations with minimal human intervention in a distributed and flexible manner [16] . Therefore, SON can significantly reduce capital expenditure (CAPEX) and OPEX for network operators [17] . In HetNets, SONs can gain more importance when the HetNets become denser and more heterogeneous. Accordingly, ON/OFF switching schemes based on SON for BSs have been extensively studied in the literatures [18] [19] [20] [21] . In LTE and LTE-advanced standards, a discontinuous transmission (DTX) and discontinuous reception (DTR) approaches are introduced where transceivers can be switched to a sleep mode whenever there is no data to transmit or receive [11] . Several predefined BS sleeping schemes according to traffic variation patterns are proposed in [22] [23] [24] . In [23] , optimal power saving schemes by reducing the number of active cells in low traffic load situations are analyzed. It is proved that a 25%-30% energy saving is possible. A random ON/OFF switching approach for SBSs is proposed in [25] . There is a tradeoff between delay and transmit power where user equipments (UEs) can save energy by delaying their transmissions in order to connect closer SBSs. In [26] , a UE offloading algorithm to balance load for the sleeping BSs is proposed. To minimize power consumption, an integer optimization problem is formulated. A sleep mechanism for IEEE 802.11 wireless local area network access points is developed in [27] . To determine the length of sleep interval, a dynamic sleep boundary decision algorithm based on the rate and delay is proposed. A sleep mode approach for BSs based on a binary social spider algorithm is proposed in [28] . In [29] , two low complexity approximation algorithms are proposed to select the active BSs set that can preserve the UEs' minimal rate requirements. For the BS ON/OFF switching problem, two simple greedy-on and greedy-off algorithms are proposed in [30] . Furthermore, Son et al. [30] develop the greedy heuristic algorithms based on the distances between BSs without any additional signaling overhead. In [31] , a BS switch-OFF algorithm based on an artificial neural network is developed. In order to offload UEs from MBSs to SBSs or neighboring MBSs, a decentralized sleep mechanism for MBSs is introduced in [32] . In this mechanism, it is assumed that the SBSs are always ON. By exploiting the cooperation of cells in HetNets, a sleep mode technique for SBSs is proposed in [33] . In [34] , a centralized greedy-add algorithm is proposed for the BS switch-OFF approach. To investigate the effect of cell sorting on the energy saving, three different BS sorting criteria are compared. For BS ON/OFF switching problem in the HetNets, a centralized algorithm based on the simulated-annealing search is proposed in [35] . A game theoretic approach for switching OFF BSs in a network with two operators is proposed in [36] , where a cooperation between the operators is required. To find the optimal BS sleeping strategies, a distributed cooperative approach is proposed in [37] . The problem is formulated as a constrained graphical game, in which the set of players corresponds to the set of BSs, and the solution converges to a generalized Nash equilibrium. In this approach, the neighboring BSs cooperate with each other based on the load to reduce the energy consumption, while guaranteeing UE's quality of service (QoS). Furthermore, it only requires local information exchange among the neighboring BSs in the network. The proposed mechanisms in [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] , rely on centralized methods or require cooperation among BSs in the network. Thus, they come at the expense of knowing local or global information. This means that, some information is needed to exchange among BSs. Therefore, they may increase the signaling overhead in the networks. However, such approaches have their own advantages, and the outcomes obtained from the fully distributed approaches might not always be as good as the outcomes obtained from the approaches that utilize the local or global information.
Noncooperative game theory plays a fundamental role for enabling SON feature. In [38] , an energy-efficient resource management for SONs using game theoretic framework is proposed. To save energy consumption, BSs employ an ON/OFF switching algorithm, where there is a tradeoff between energy consumption reduction and load. To solve the game, a regret based learning algorithm is applied, in which BSs select their transmission power in a distributed manner. The proposed algorithm converges to an -coarse correlated equilibrium. From this point of view, players in the game aim at optimizing their utility functions by selfishly choosing theirs strategies. For most widely used applications in wireless networks, players seek strategies that meet certain performance constraints, instead of optimizing the individual performance [39] . Games in satisfaction-form enable players to adapt their strategies to guarantee these constraints. The idea of satisfaction game and the corresponding notion of equilibrium in decentralized self-configuring networks are introduced in [40] [41] [42] . In [43] , the problem of QoS provisioning in decentralized networks is modeled as a satisfaction game approach. Moreover, a comparison between the concept of generalized Nash equilibrium and the satisfaction equilibrium is provided.
However, when a BS switches between ON and OFF modes, there is a switching cost which cannot be ignored. This issue has not been addressed properly in the aforementioned research works. In this paper, we use the framework of satisfaction equilibrium, and propose satisfaction based approaches for BS ON/OFF switching problem. In these approaches, the ON/OFF switching problem is modeled as a noncooperative game in satisfaction-form, in which players only need to achieve target utility constraints. Our proposed framework considers a multi-level threshold mechanism. In order to meet an equilibrium, we introduce adaptive satisfaction thresholds for players that are unable to achieve satisfaction. There are two issues involved in this problem: 1) for given satisfaction thresholds, forming a satisfaction game and applying a learning algorithm, such that the set of satisfied players is maximized, and 2) decreasing satisfaction thresholds for the set of unsatisfied players after a predefined time interval. If the player is satisfied, it has no inclination to change its strategy. To solve the game in a distritbuted manner, we apply a regret based satisfaction algorithm and a satisfaction equilibrium search algorithm (SESA). In the regret based satisfaction algorithm, players play each strategy with a non-zero probability and based on their regrets. In the SESA, each player only requires the value of its individual utility to assign a probability distribution to its strategies.
The proposed satisfaction based approaches can help to reduce the number of switches in BSs, and thus switching costs. Furthermore, they do not require a central controller and information exchange. Therefore, they are executed in a fully distributed manner, and suitable for dense BSs deployments scenarios. Since players can only target satisfactory performance levels, they can reduce the computational complexity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system model. Section III presents the problem statement, and formulates the ON/OFF switching problem as a satisfaction-form game. Furthermore, a no-regret learning algorithm and a learning algorithm based on the observed utility are described to learn a satisfaction equilibrium. In section IV, we evaluate the performance of the proposed approach, and Section V concludes the paper.
Notations: The regular and boldface symbols refer to scalars and matrices, respectively. For any finite set A, the cardinality of set A and the set of all probability distributions over it are denoted by |A| and (A), respectively. The function 1 φ denotes the indicator function which equals 1 if event φ is true and 0, otherwise. The set of real numbers is denoted by R. Furthermore, the single-and n-dimension space of all real non-negative numbers are denoted by R + and R n + , respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the downlink of a two-tier HetNet consisting of the set of MBSs B M overlaid with a set of SBSs B S . For each MBS's coverage area, a MBS is located at the center of area, and the SBSs are uniformly distributed within the coverage of the MBS as shown in Fig. 1 . The set of UEs is denoted by K, which are uniformly distributed over the area. Assume that each UE k ∈ K can be associated with at most one BS at each time.
Let p b (t) be the transmit power of BS b at time instant t. In order to save energy, BSs can switch to an OFF mode. In this respect, each BS b ∈ B is either in an ON mode (i.e. p b (t) > 0) or an OFF mode (i.e. p b (t) = 0) at time instant t. To characterise the power consumption at a BS, we need to consider the efficiency of the power amplifier, the consumed power in the components such as baseband unit, radio frequency module, and cooling system. The consumed power of various components in BSs depends on the BS type. We adopt a linear power consumption model proposed in [44] which can be expressed as:
with
and
where P PA b (t), P RF b , and P BB b indicate the power consumed by power amplifier, radio frequency module, and baseband engine, respectively. Parameter η PA b denotes the power amplifier efficiency of BS b.
represent the losses which are incurred by feeder, DC-DC power supply, main supply, and cooling system, respectively. Typically, the feeder losses can be ignored for SBSs. Note that there are no cooling equipments in SBSs. In order to select different amounts for the power levels, there are several practical limitations that are imposed by standards and hardware, such as minimum and maximum transmission power. Practically, there are only limited number of discrete power levels available at the transmitter. Therefore, we consider finite and predetermined number of discrete power levels for BSs [45] . Suppose UE k is served by BS b, and σ 2 denotes the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) power. We assume that all BSs transmit over the same channel, i.e. co-channel deployment. To model signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR), a load coupling model is considered, in which the interference from the other BSs are scaled by their loads [46] . The load of each BS is defined as the fraction of the available VOLUME 5, 2017 resource that are being used [47] . Then, SINR experienced by UE k can be formulated as [48] , [49] :
where g b,k (t) and ρ b (t) are the channel gain between BS b and UE k and the load of BS b at time t, respectively. The
denotes the time averaged interference power [50] . This model provides a good approximation for multi-cell systems [49] , [51] . From Shannon's capacity formula, the achievable transmission rate of UE k is:
where ω is the bandwidth. Let ϑ k be the traffic influx rate of UE k. This assumption can capture different UEs' QoS demands (i.e. heterogeneous UEs) depending on hardware capabilities and UE's activity [52] . The fraction of time required to serve the traffic load from BS b to the location of UE k is defined as [53] . Therefore, the load of BS b at time t is expressed by: → R + function as defined by (6) . The load vector is obtained (if a solution exists) by solving the following nonlinear equations:
. . .
Let
In vector form, we have:
Since the load ρ appears in both sides of (8), it cannot be solved in closed-form. Note that a solution ρ * is feasible if ρ * satisfies (8) and ρ * ≥ 0. Due to the limited resources available in the network, the load cannot exceed one. Thus, if the load of a BS exceeds one, the BS will drop some UEs and/or decrease the UEs' throughput [54] . Since the function h b (ρ) is a standard interference function (SIF) as a function of ρ, the solution can be computed by using fixed point iterations.
Definition 1: A function I (x) is a SIF if for all x ≥ 0 the following properties hold [55] :
Starting from an initial load ρ 0 > 0, the unique fixed point solution (if exists) of (8) can be found iteratively by the following algorithm:
for m = 1, . . . , M , where M and ρ m are the total number of iterations and the output for iteration m, respectively. Lemma 1: If a feasible load ρ * exists for (8) , then it is unique, and ρ M converges to ρ * as M → ∞ [51] .
Proof: Proving that h b (.) is a SIF is presented in [49] . Using Theorem 7 in [55] , if the function h b (ρ) is a SIF, then the function min(h b (ρ), 1) is a SIF. Then, by applying Theorem 2 in [55] , the convergence is proved.
From (6), with increasing the transmission power of BS b, the SINR of its associated UEs increases. Therefore, given the traffic influx rate of its UEs, the load of BS b decreases. Thus, there is the tradeoff between BS's load and energy consumption reduction. Moreover, the load grows with the traffic demand and the amount of interference [48] . In the following section, the problem of selecting BS's power level is presented.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In most existing works that consider the problem of switching BS's power level, the number of ON/OFF switchings is not considered. In practical systems, switchings in a BS impose an additional power consumption. In a specific case, switching between ON and OFF modes incurs an energy cost that is needed to switch ON and OFF some components of a BS. Moreover, a portion of energy is consumed for signaling for re-association of the dropped UEs by BSs that switch to a sleep mode [56] . For future generation cellular networks, cloud radio access network (C-RAN) is considered as a novel mobile network architecture [57] . In C-RAN, BSs' switchings will cause the high variations of resource demand in the servers of C-RAN. As a result, it will yield the higher switching cost, including: the energy used, the delay in migration connections/data, increased wear-and-tear on the servers, and the risk associated with server toggling [58] .
Our objective is to reduce the energy consumption of BSs while satisfying QoS requirement and avoiding frequent switchings. Due to the limited device lifetime and switching energy consumption, it is necessary to minimize the number of switchings [59] . Further, ON/OFF switching in BSs must be coupled with UE association problem: when a BS switches to an OFF mode, its associated UEs need to migrate to another BSs. Therefore, UE association problem should be considered jointly with the BS operation problem [30] .
A. UE ASSOCIATION
At time t, UE k is associated with BS b(k, t) based on the received signal power and BS's estimated load as follows [60] :
whereρ b (t) denotes the estimated load of BS b at time t, which is advertised by BS b through a broadcast control message. The estimated loadρ b (t) is calculated based on history as follows [61] :
where τ (t) is the learning rate for the load estimation.
B. ON/OFF SWITCHING GAME IN SATISFACTION-FORM
In this section, we solve the ON/OFF switching in two steps. In the first step, for a given satisfaction threshold, a learning algorithm is used to solve the game such that the set of satisfied players is maximized. In the second step, for the set of unsatisfied players, the satisfaction thresholds decrease. Now, we define a utility function including the energy consumption and load, as follows:
where ω b and φ b are the weight parameters for BS b that indicate the impact of energy and load on the utility function, respectively. Parameter P TM b denotes the maximum power consumed by BS b when it transmits with its maximum power. Then, the energy saving problem can be formulated as:
where P max b denotes the maximum transmit power of BS b. The constraint in (13b) corresponds to the limits on the BSs' transmission power. The constraints in (13c)-(13d) are related to the definition of load. In general, to solve the problem (13), a game G NF in normal-form can be used which is described by the following triplet:
where B and A b are the set of BSs as the players and the strategy set of player b, respectively. The utility function of player b is given by u b :
To solve the problem (13) with avoiding frequent mode switchings, we model the G NF in satisfaction-form which can be defined as follows: 
• Correspondence: The correspondence f b is defined as follows:
where b denotes a threshold value for player b, which represents the satisfactory threshold for the player. Definition 2 (Satisfaction Equilibrium): A strategy profile a = (a 1 , . . . , a |B| ) is an equilibrium for the game G SF if
In other words, a strategy profile a is an equilibrium if the strategy at all players corresponds to a strategy that yields satisfaction given all other players' strategies. In wireless networks, simultaneously satisfying all players might not always be feasible, and thus a satisfaction equilibrium does not exist. In such a case, there are two options [62] :
• find the largest subset of satisfied players • redefine the satisfaction thresholds for unsatisfied players. To implement the first option, if a player is unsatisfied for a certain time period, it will select a do-nothing strategy for a period of time. In the second option, the satisfaction threshold is decreased for each unsatisfied player. Here, we consider the second option. In this regard, we divide time period (i.e. total number of iterations) T into N time intervals with duration T /N . In each time interval [T i , T i+1 ), the satisfaction threshold is constant, and it is lower than previous threshold, i.e. b (T i ) < b (T i−1 ) . Therefore, we consider the adaptive threshold which is defined as follows:
where T i is i th time interval of time period T . Moreover, in each interval T i , the player keeps a constant b (T i ). Note that T i should be large enough such that the player is able to try all strategies in order to satisfy. When all players are simultaneously satisfied, an equilibrium is observed.
For each player b, we choose a proper choice b (T i ) for i = 0. If none of its strategies lead to meeting its satisfaction threshold b (T 0 ), the player need to decrease the threshold. We redefine the threshold b (T i ) as follows:
where 0 < δ < 1 denotes a decrement coefficient. If the player chooses a strategy that satisfies it, then it has no incentive to deviate from it.
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In order to find a strategy that satisfies the constraint, the player can adopt the following algorithm: i) For a time interval T 0 , the player b starts by choosing a strategy from its strategy set A b . ii) If the player is satisfied, it has no incentive to deviate from it. iii) If the player is not satisfied, it selects another strategy according a learning tool. To learn at least one satisfaction equilibrium, players utilize one of the behavioral rules described in the next subsection.
C. LEARNING THE SATISFACTION EQUILIBRIUM
In this subsection, two learning algorithms are presented to distributively achieve a satisfaction equilibrium.
1) REGRET BASED SATISFACTION ALGORITHM
Each player b ∈ B chooses its strategy as follows. In the first iteration, the player selects its strategy following an arbitrary probability distribution π b (0) ∈ (A b ). Letṽ b (t) be the satisfaction indicator of BS b such thatṽ b (t) = 1 indicates that BS b is satisfied at time t andṽ b (t) = 0, otherwise. At time t, player b keeps playing the same action played at time t − 1, if it is satisfied (i.e.ṽ b (t − 1) = 1). If the player is not satisfied (i.e.ṽ b (t − 1) = 0), it may change its strategy. In this case, it chooses its strategy based on a probability distribution π b (t). Therefore, the player selects the strategy according to [43] :
where ∼ π b (t) means according to the probability distribution π b (t). In order to evaluate the probability distribution π b (t), each player evaluates its regret for not having played its strategies, and aims at minimizing its regret [63] . In order to calculate the regret, the player needs the knowledge of other players' strategies. Thus, a learning tool is applied. For each player b ∈ B and a b ∈ A b , the estimated utility u b,a b (t), the estimated regret R b,a b (t), and the probability π b,a b (t) are updated as follows [63] :
where κ, ζ > 0 and ν > 0 denote the learning rate exponents. Let
] is the Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution vector defined as follows:
where 1 θ b > 0 denotes the temperature parameter for player b. In the learning algorithm, we consider the utility estimation procedure as a fast process relative to the regret estimation, and the regret estimation procedure as a fast process relative to the strategy distribution process [63] . Thus, the learning rate exponents are chosen as ν > ζ > κ. Since players may not update (21)- (23) at each iteration, thus the proposed approach can reduce the computational complexity with respect to a normal-form game G NF which uses the learning algorithm (21)- (23) to solve the game. The behavioral rule in (20)- (23) are summarized in Algorithm 1.
Theorem 1: Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to converge to a satisfaction equilibrium of game G SF in finite time.
Proof: The proof of Theorem 1 is presented in Appendix A.
2) SATISFACTION EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH ALGORITHM (SESA)
This approach is the modified version of the algorithm proposed in [64] , which is based on the observed utilities. It uses the knowledge of the individual utility to assign the probabilities to the strategies. In the SESA approach, each player b ∈ B selects its strategy according to (20) . If the player is not satisfied, it updates its strategy according to a probability update function d b π b,a b (t) which is defined as follows [41] : (25) where α b (t) = 1 t+1 is the learning rate of BS b. The parameter r b (t) is computed as follows:
Thus, the probability distribution for each player b ∈ B is described as follows:
The pseudocode for SESA is presented in Algorithm 2. The point here is that, each player only requires the value of its individual utility at time t. Moreover, the increment in the probability of each strategy depends on the observed utility and the learning rate [65] . Proof: This theorem is proved similar to Theorem 1. However, please note that we need the probability distribution in (27) to fulfill the constraint π b,a b (t + 1) > 0 for end for 14: end if 15 : end for 16: while 0 ≤ t < T do 17: t ← t + 1 18: for ∀b ∈ B do 19: ifṽ b (t − 1) = 1 then else 22: Select a strategy a b (t) ∼ π b (t) {BS b is not satisfied, and it selects its strategy according to the probability distribution π b (t).} 23: end if 24: Calculate u b (t), {using (12) .} 25: if end for 32: end if 33: end for 34: end while ∀b ∈ B, ∀a b ∈ A b and t ≥ 0. Thus, at least one strategy profile exists that satisfies all players, and as a result, it converges to a satisfaction equilibrium.
Algorithm 1 (Regret Based satisfaction): Learning the Satisfaction Equilibrium of the Game
Note that a lower satisfaction threshold leads to finding a solution faster, while a higher satisfaction threshold can lead to a better performance.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
To evaluate the performance of our proposed schemes, we consider a HetNet with a hexagonal layout with one MBS for ∀a b ∈ A b do 12: Update π b,a b (1), {using (25).} 13: end for 14: end if 15 : end for 16: while 0 ≤ t < T do 17: t ← t + 1 18: for ∀b ∈ B do 19: ifṽ b (t − 1) = 1 then 20: a b (t) = a b (t − 1) {BS b is satisfied and it does not change its strategy.} 21: else 22: Select a strategy a b (t) ∼ π b (t) {BS b is not satisfied, and it selects its strategy according to the probability distribution π b (t).} 23: end if 24: Calculate u b (t), {using (12) .} 25: if
else 28:ṽ b (t) = 0 {BS b is not satisfied.} 29: for ∀a b ∈ A b do 30: Update π b,a b (t + 1), {using (25) .} 31: end for 32: end if 33: end for 34: end while located in the center of network. The set of SBSs and UEs are uniformly distributed in the coverage of MBS. The maximum transmit power of the MBS and the SBSs are 46 dBm and 30 dBm, respectively [66] . Some other factors which contribute to calculate the energy consumption of the BSs are chosen based on [67] . The channel is represented as a path loss fading according to [68] . The parameters used for the simulations are summarized in Table 1 . Moreover, the presented results are averaged over a large number of independent runs (Monte Carlo simulations).
We consider an initial satisfaction threshold value ( b (T 0 )), for all BSs in the network. It is assumed that the BSs have a lower initial satisfaction threshold ( 0 = −0.5) or a higher initial satisfaction threshold ( 0 = −0.3).
The proposed satisfaction based ON/OFF switching mechanisms are compared with the no-regret learning algorithm without considering satisfaction for players, which is presented in [53] , referred to hereinafter as ''regret based ON/OFF switching''. In this approach, the players utilize the learning algorithm described in (21)- (23), at each time instant (i.e. solving the game G NF ). For further comparisons, we consider a random BS ON/OFF switching approach, in which each player selects its strategy with equal probability (i.e. π b,a b (t) = 1 |A b | for ∀b ∈ B and ∀a b ∈ A b ). This approach is referred to as ''random ON/OFF''. Fig. 2 shows the changes in average utility per BS as the number of SBSs varies. As the number of SBSs increases, average energy consumption per BS decreases, and the average utility per BS increases. Since the proposed approaches with initial threshold vector 0 save more energy compared to the other approaches, they improve the average utility per BS. For 0 , two proposed satisfaction approaches have almost the same performance, while SESA slightly improves average utility compared with the regret based satisfaction approach for 0 . In this respect, the regret based satisfaction approach with initial threshold vector 0 yields, respectively, up to 13%, 16.5%, and 38% of utility improvement, relative to the regret based ON/OFF switching, random ON/OFF, and the satisfaction based approaches with initial threshold 0 , for a network with 16 SBSs. We consider an energy efficiency (EE) metric defined as the ratio between average throughput per BS and average energy consumption per BS. Fig. 3 illustrates the EE versus different number of SBSs. We can see that the proposed approaches with initial threshold vector 0 improve the EE. For instance, when the number of SBS = 22, the regret based satisfaction approach improves the EE, respectively, up to 10.7%, 19.4%, and 44.9% as compared to the regret based ON/OFF switching, random ON/OFF, and the satisfaction approaches with initial threshold 0 . This is due to the fact that the proposed approaches save more energy compared to the other approaches.
In General, it is more desirable to have a stable condition for the network, and avoid too many changes in the network settings. By reducing the number of switchings and power level changes, each receiver will experience a more stable channel condition and less change in the interference level. Hence, less effort is required for the receivers for adaptation to new channel conditions. The normalized amount of change in the power level can be shown by Fig. 7 show the average number of switchings between an ON and OFF mode during 7000 iterations. In Fig. 6 , we can observe that the regret based ON/OFF switching and random ON/OFF approaches switch frequently. Practically, such a frequent ON/OFF switching is not acceptable for BSs. In contrast, in the proposed satisfaction approaches, BSs switch less than the other approaches. The reason is that, in the proposed approaches, BSs tend to keep modes, unless they are not satisfied. Fig. 7 illustrates the average number of ON/OFF switchings for the proposed approaches. It can be seen that for 0 , the regret based satisfaction approach has lower number of switchings compared to the SESA. Moreover, the satisfaction approach with higher threshold switches between ON and OFF modes more than the satisfaction approach with lower threshold. Therefore, the tradeoff between the energy saved from the ON/OFF switching and the number of switchings can be balanced by adjusting the threshold values.
In Fig. 8 , we show the convergence time of the proposed approaches to a satisfaction equilibrium versus the number of SBSs for 0 = −0.5 and 0 = −0.3. We can see that with increasing the number of SBSs, the average number of iterations for convergence increases. For a given satisfaction threshold, two proposed approaches have almost the same convergence time. Moreover, Fig. 8 shows that reducing the satisfaction threshold leads to a faster convergence time. For instance, it shows that for regret based satisfaction approach, the average number of iterations for convergence for a network with 14 SBSs reaches up to about 1707 and 733 iterations with satisfaction threshold 0 and 0 , respectively.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed two low-complexity BS ON/OFF switching mechanisms, i.e. regret based satisfaction algorithm and SESA, for HetNets, where BSs can choose VOLUME 5, 2017 their transmission power to save energy. In the SESA and the regret based satisfaction algorithm, BSs select each strategy based on the individual utilities and their regrets, respectively. The proposed approaches use the satisfaction based learning algorithms to avoid frequent BS switchings. In the proposed approaches, BSs are interested in achieving certain levels of satisfaction. By adjusting the threshold values, the tradeoff between the energy saved from the ON/OFF switching and the number of switchings is balanced. To operate in a practical environment, where simultaneously satisfying all players might not always be feasible, an option is provided to ensure convergence. This option allows the unsatisfied BSs redefine their satisfaction thresholds. The proposed approaches do not impose any signaling overhead, and thus can implement in a distributed way. Simulation results have shown that the proposed approaches provide better performance over other benchmark algorithms, and significantly outperform them in terms of the EE and average BS's utility. Furthermore, they significantly reduce the number of switchings at BSs.
APPENDIX PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: As [43] , we consider the following hypothesis of game
• The game G SF has at least one equilibrium.
• For all b ∈ B the set f b is not empty.
• The sets B and {A b } b∈B are finite. The first hypothesis ensures that the players are assigned a feasible task. The second hypothesis refers to the fact that each player is able to find a strategy to satisfy it, given the strategies of all other players. The third hypothesis is considered to ensure the convergence of the algorithm in finite time. Since π b,a b > 0, ∀b ∈ B, a b ∈ A b , t > 1, thus every strategy profile can be played at least once during sufficiently large iterations. According to (23), we have:
Since 0 < (t) at time t > 1 will be non-zero. Furthermore, after a large number of iterations, if a satisfaction equilibrium is not observed, then the target utility (satisfaction threshold) decreases. Thus, at least one strategy profile exists that satisfies the satisfaction thresholds, and no player changes its strategy. 
